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Abstract
This paper examines the system of Qualified Majority Voting, used by the Council of
Ministers of the European Union, from the perspective of enlargement of the Union. It
uses an approach based on power indices due to Penrose, Banzhaf and Coleman to make
two analyses: (1) the question of the voting power of member countries from the point of
view of fairness, and (2) the question of how the majority quota required for QMV shoul
be determined. It studies two scenarios for change from 2005 onwards envisaged by the
Nice Treaty: (1) no enlargement, the EU comprising 15 member countries, and (2) full
enlargement to 27 members by the accession of all the present twelve candidates. The
proposal is made that fair weights be determined algorithmically as a technical or routine
matter as the membership changes. The analysis of how the quota affects power shows
the trade-offs that countries face between their blocking power and the power of the
Council to act. The main findings are: (1) that the weights laid down in the Nice Treaty
are close to being fair, the only significant discrepancies being the under representation of
Germany and Romania, and the over representation of Spain and Poland; (2) the majority
quota required for a decision is set too high for the Council of Ministers to be an effective
decision making body.
Keywords: EU Council of Ministers; Nice Treaty; Qualified Majority Voting;
Weighted Voting; Voting Power
Address for correspondence
Dr Dennis Leech
Department of Economics, University of Warwick,
Coventry, CV4 7AL, United Kingdom.
Tel: 024 7652 3047
Email: D.Leech@warwick.ac.uk, http://www.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/Economics/leech/
For information about the VPP programme:
http://www.lse.ac.uk/Depts/cpnss/proj_votpow.htm
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Moshé Machover and Dan Felsenthal for advice and comments
on this work. A preliminary version was presented to a seminar in the Centre for the Study of Globalisation
and Regionalisation at Warwick University. I would like to thank all participants for their comments.
                                         
1 This paper is preliminary and may be changed in light of comments received. Please do not quote without
permission of the author.
Comments welcome
21. INTRODUCTION
The prospect of enlargement of the European Union by the accession of new member countries
from Eastern Europe has posed fundamental questions about how its institutions of governance
should change in response. The Intergovernmental Conference held in Nice in December 2000
was held to address these issues and produce an agreement on the basic structures of decision
making as a framework for enlargement. However the Nice Treaty has been criticised and should
be regarded as only a limited success.
The main focus of the conference was on the extension of the range of decisions taken by
Qualified Majority Voting in the Council of Ministers and on the technicalities of how this
system would work from 2005 onwards. There was considerable discussion of how the weighted
votes should be allocated to each member country and what the decision rule should be in terms
of the majority quota. The treaty made provision for new weights for the existing fifteen
members and for twelve candidates. It also provided for changes to the decision rule in terms of
the size of the majority required for a proposal to pass. These changes have been analysed
rigorously in terms of a priori voting power by Felsenthal and Machover (2001) who concluded
that, while the allocation of voting weights is relatively fair in the sense that the system gives
electors in different countries roughly similar voting power, the majority quota agreed on is set
too high for the Council to be an effective democratic decision-making body. The present paper
builds on that study, partly duplicating it, but also extending it.2
I investigate the properties of the voting systems laid down in the treaty to apply both before and
after enlargement, duplicating the analysis of Felsenthal and Machover (2001). I also consider
the normative question of what the voting weights should be in order that the system is fair. I
apply an algorithm for choosing the weights so as to achieve a given distribution of voting power
among the members.3 This is proposed as a general procedure that could be applied in a more or
less routine manner each time the membership changes: every time a new member country joins
                                         
2 Other studies of voting power in the EU Council of Ministers include Hosli (1993, 1995, 1996, 1 98), Widgren
(1994), Felsenthal and Machover (1998, 2000), Laruelle and Widgren (1998), Nurmi and Meskanen (1999), Sutter
(2000).
3its voting weight can be calculated, and those of all existing members recalculated, by this
algorithm in accordance with the agreed general criterion of fairness. The Nice Summit was held
to determine the voting weights once and for all so that there would be no need to hold an
Intergovernmental Conference every time new members joined. The general procedure proposed
is an alternative that would have the advantage of giving fair weights in all cases. I also
investigate how the choice of decision rule affects voting power given the Nice weights.
I address the following specific questions in terms of a priori voting power. Separate analyses
are reported for the Union comprising the existing 15 and after enlargement to 27.
(1) What is the distribution of voting power among the member countries given by the
voting system and weights in the Nice Treaty?
(2) How should the weights be chosen if the aim is to ensure that all citizens of the EU
have equal voting power?
(3) What is the effect of the majority quota required for weighted majority voting on
the power of the council to act and also the powers of the individual members?
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the system of Qualified Majority Voting,
and the Nice Treaty is described in Section 3. Section 4 outlines the measurement of power
under weighted voting, using the power indices due to P nros , Banzhaf and Coleman. The idea
of fair weighting and reweighting is defined and the algorithmic approach described in Section 5.
Section 6 presents the analysis of the distribution of voting power and the fair weights under the
Nice Treaty. Section 7 presents the analysis of the majority quota for Qualified Majority Voting
and Section 8 concludes.
2. QUALIFIED MAJORITY VOTING
The Council of Ministers is the most senior decision-making body within the EU under the
Treaty of Rome. It uses different decision rules for different matters, u animi y for certain
matters affecting members’ fundamental sovereignty, but qualified majority voting for others. Its
key features are: (1) that all members have a seat but their respective numbers of votes are
                                                                                                                              
3 A similar approach has been proposed by Laruelle and Widgren (1998) and used by Sutter (2000). It has also been
4different to reflect their different populations; and (2) decisions are taken by qualified majority
voting with respect to a decision rule based on a supermajority requirement defined by a quota.
The quota has always been set at about 71 percent of the total voting weight.
Table 1 provides an overview of the evolution of the system since its origin in 1958. It shows
that larger countries have always received a smaller share of the voting weight than their share of
the population, reflecting the need to ensure adequate representation of small countries as
independent states. The inference has frequently been drawn from this that the larger countries
are relatively under represented. The response to this has been to keep the quota very high so that
the power of the large countries is protected. This has meant that any decision has always
required the support of at least two out of the big four countries (Germany, UK, France and
Italy); therefore these members have a considerable ability to prevent action.
Such arguments however are based on a simple comparison of population shares with vote shares
and ignore relative voting power. The fact that decisions are taken by block-voting, each member
country casting all its votes together – in contrast to the European Parliament where MEPs are
not constrained to vote as national groups – means that the relationship between voting power
and weight is complex. It is well known that, in general, in a legislature that uses weighted
voting, relative voting powers of members are different from relative numbers of votes,
sometimes substantially so.4 In making this comparison it is necessary to examine the rules of the
legislature in relation to all the possible voting outcomes that could conceivably occur.
While choosing a high level for the quota has the advantage of protecting the large countries
against being outvoted too easily, it has the disadvantage that it limits the effectiveness of the
council by making it difficult, a priori, to make a decision and therefore imparts a considerable
bias in favour of the status quo. It also restricts the ability of all members to get their own
proposals accepted, including those of the large members themselves, whose sovereignty it is
meant to protect. The choice of the quota was on the agenda at the Nice Summit but its level was
                                                                                                                              
used in Leech (2000b).
4 This is described in Felsenthal and Machover (1998).
5not reduced despite the substantial extension of the scope of qualified majority voting to cover a
greater range of policy areas.
Table 1: Qualified Majority Voting: Weights and Populations
1958-72 1973-80 1981-85 1986-94 1995-
Wt% % Pop Wt% % Pop Wt% % Pop Wt% % Pop Wt% % Pop Pop (m)
Germany 4 23.532.2 10 17.224.2 10 15.922.8 10 13.218.9 10 11.521.9 82.0
UK - - 10 17.221.8 10 15.920.5 10 13.217.6 10 11.515.8 59.2
France 4 23.526.6 10 17.220.3 10 15.920.0 10 13.217.2 10 11.515.7 59.0
Italy 4 23.529.1 10 17.221.4 10 15.920.9 10 13.217.6 10 11.515.3 57.6
Spain - - - - - - 8 10.512.0 8 9.2 10.5 39.4
Netherlands 2 11.86.6 5 8.6 5.2 5 7.9 5.3 5 6.6 4.5 5 5.7 4.2 15.8
Greece - - - - 5 7.9 3.6 5 6.6 3.1 5 5.7 2.8 10.5
Belgium 2 11.85.4 5 8.6 3.8 5 7.9 3.6 5 6.6 3.1 5 5.7 2.7 10.2
Portugal - - - - - - 5 6.6 3.1 5 5.7 2.7 10.0
Sweden - - - - - - - - 4 4.6 2.4 8.9
Austria - - - - - - - - 4 4.6 2.2 8.1
Denmark 3 5.2 2.0 3 4.8 1.9 3 3.9 1.6 3 3.4 1.4 5.3
Finland - - - - - - - - 3 3.4 1.4 5.2
Ireland - - 3 5.2 1.2 3 4.8 1.3 3 3.9 1.1 3 3.4 1.0 3.7
Luxembourg1 5.9 0.2 2 3.4 0.1 2 3.2 0.1 2 2.6 0.1 2 2.3 0.1 0.4
Total 17 100100 58 100100 63 100100 76 100100 87 100100 375.3
Quota q 12 70.6 41 70.7 45 71.4 54 71.1 62 71.3
Source of data: Felsenthal and Machover (2001)
3. THE TREATY OF NICE
The Nice Treaty amended the system of Qualified Majority Voting to apply from 2005. It laid
down the rules of decision making on different scenarios for enlargement. For each assumed
scenario weighted voting is at the heart of the system but two additional conditions which must
also be met have been added, in terms of the number of countries and population.5 The system
should therefore be thought of as one requiring a triple majority. For a proposal to pass three
conditions must be satisfied: (1) the number of weighted votes equalling or exceeding the quota ;
(2) a simple majority of the member countries; (3) a supermajority (62%) of the population must
                                         
5 See EU (2001). The provisions laying down the first scenario are in Article 3 of the Protocol on the Enlargement
of the European Union (pp97-8). The second scenario is based on the Declaration on the Qualified Majority
Threshold and the Number of Votes for a Blocking Minority in an Enlarged Union (p.167).
6be represented. In fact, as Felsenthal and Machover (2001) have shown, conditions (2) and (3)
add little in that there are very few voting outcomes in which either is not met when (1) is.
Nevertheless I allow for all three conditions in the following analysis.
Two scenarios are assumed for 2005:
(1) No enlargement. No new members have acceded and the EU comprises the same
fifteen countries as at present. The triple-majority system in this case is referred to as
N15.6 When I analyse the effect of the quota I assume condition (1) only; this
decision-making system based on weighted voting is referred to as W15.
(2) Maximum enlargement. All candidates have joined and the EU has expanded to 27
members. I refer to this case under the provisions of the treaty as N27, and the
weighted majority system as W27, respectively.
Table 2 shows the member countries together with their voting weights, the quota and the
decision rule for N15. The big four countries all have 29 votes, 12.2% of the total, Spain slightly
fewer with 27, the Netherlands,13, traditionally the same as, but now getting slightly more than,
Belgium, 12, and so on, finally Luxembourg having 4. This allocation of weigh s represents a
slight shift towards the larger countries compared with the present weights reported in Table 1.
The quota is set at 169 out of a total of 237 votes, representing 71.3 percent, the same as before.
A decision under N15 therefore requires the support of: (1) at least 169 weighted votes, (2) eight
member countries, and (3) member countries whose combined population is at least 62 percent
of the total.
                                         
6 This nomenclature was used by Felsenthal nd Machover (2001). They looked at two variants for the union of 27
members because of ambiguity in the text, which they labelled N27 and N’27. The difference is that in the former
the quota is stated as 258 while in the latter the blocking minority is stated as 91, which means that the quota is
lowered to 255. I have ignored this distinction and analysed the second case on the assumption that this is the
authoritative version; I have called this case N27.
7Table 2:N15, No Enlargement
Member Votes Votes %
Germany 29 12.2
UK 29 12.2
France 29 12.2
Italy 29 12.2
Spain 27 11.4
Netherlands13 5.5
Greece 12 5.1
Belgium 12 5.1
Portugal 12 5.1
Sweden 10 4.2
Austria 10 4.2
Denmark 7 3.0
Finland 7 3.0
Ireland 7 3.0
Luxembourg4 1.7
Total 237 100
Quota = 169
(71.3%)
Decision Rule:
1. Combined weight  169
2. No. of members  8
3. Population  62%
Table 3 shows the equivalent data after all the current candidates have been admitted. The total
number of weighted votes is now 345 with the quota set at 255. This represents a relative
increase in the quota to 73.9% of the total w igh ed votes. Despite this increase in the quota,
however, it is now no longer possible for three of the big four to block a decision. As I show
below, this increase in the quota cannot be said to benefit either the Council or the individual
member countries concerned.
8Table 3: N27, Enlargement by all 12 candidates
Member Votes Votes %
Germany 29 8.4
UK 29 8.4
France 29 8.4
Italy 29 8.4
Spain 27 7.8
Poland 27 7.8
Romania 14 4.1
Netherlands 13 3.8
Greece 12 3.5
Czech Rep 12 3.5
Belgium 12 3.5
Hungary 12 3.5
Portugal 12 3.5
Sweden 10 2.9
Bulgaria 10 2.9
Austria 10 2.9
Slovakia 7 2.0
Denmark 7 2.0
Finland 7 2.0
Ireland 7 2.0
Lithuania 7 2.0
Latvia 4 1.2
Slovenia 4 1.2
Estonia 4 1.2
Cyprus 4 1.2
Luxembourg 4 1.2
Malta 3 0.9
Total 345 100
Quota = 255 (73.9%)
Decision Rule:
1.Weight  255
2. No. members  14
3. Population  62%
4. MEASUREMENT OF POWER IN WEIGHTED VOTING SYSTEMS
Now I describe the measures used to analyse power under weighted voting.7 Two approaches
will be used: first, analyses of relative voting power of members within a given legislature using
the Banzhaf power index, and second, analyses of absolute voting power using the Penrose index
and three indices proposed by Coleman (the power to act, the power to prevent action and the
                                         
7 The use of power indices to study the EU has attracted a lot of criticism from Garrett and Ts belis (1996, 1999).
The reader who is interested in this debate is referred to the symposium in the Journal of Theoretical Politics in
1999, especially Lane and Berg (1999) and to Felsenthal and Machover (2001).
9power to initiate action).8 The former, relative power analysis, is useful for making comparisons
of a priori voting power between members within a given body with given weights and quota,
and also as the basis of a suitable choice of the weights using the algorithm I will describe below,
but useless for making comparisons between different voting bodies. On the other hand the
absolute measures can be used for such comparisons and in particular to study the effect of the
quota. First it is necessary to give definitions.
A voting body has n members with voting weights, w1, w2, . . . , n and a decision rule in terms of
a quota, q. The set of all members is N. All the indices are based on counting swings, voting
outcomes that can be changed from losing to winning by members changing how they cast their
weighted vote. A particular voting outcome will be referred to as a division.
A swing for member i is a coalition (corresponding to a division) represented by a subset of
members Si, N ÊSi, i ÏSi, such that
                   
j ÎS i
å wj < q   and   
j ÎS i
å wj + wi  q.
Let the number of swings for i be hi and the total number of swings be h = h iå . The total
number of divisions, the number of subsets of N, is 2n.
Five measures of power are used, defined as follows.9
(1) The Penrose Measure for i is the proportion of all possible divisions which are swings,
denoted by pi:
     pi = hi/ 2n-1 i=1,2,..,n
 This provides an absolute measure of each member’s voting power which is used directly in the
analysis of the quota and as the basis of the definition of the Banzhaf index.
                                         
8 Banzhaf (1965), Penrose (1946), Coleman (1971).
9 Other power indices than these have been used, in particular the well known index proposed in Shapley and Shubik
(1954), which provides a measure of relative voting power often regarded as comparable with the Banzhaf index,
but based on a completely different coalition model. The decision not to use the Shapley-Shubik index here is based
on two considerations: first it was found not to perform well in a comparison of its empirical properties with those of
the Banzhaf index in Leech (2000a), and second, its theoretical basis in the theory of bargaining games makes it
unsuitable as a measure of I-power (as distinct from P-power: see Felsenthal nd Machover (1998)).
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(2) The Banzhaf Power Index for member i is the member’s relative number of swings, the
normalised version of the Penrose measure, denoted by bi:
bi  =  hi/h   =   pi/Spi i=1,2,..,n
This can be interpreted as giving the share of member i in the combined capacity of all members
to influence decisions. This index is used to analyse relative powers of members under the Treaty
of Nice and also as the basis of the approach to the fair choice of weights.
 (3) The Power of the Body to Act measures of the ease with which members' interests in a
division can be translated into actual decisions, denoted by PTA. The measure is a property of
the voting body itself, rather than any particular member. It is defined as the proportion of all the
theoretically possible divisions that lead to a decision.
PTA = w/ 2n,
where w is the number of winning divisions (i.e. divisions where the total number of votes
exceeds the quota). This measure is important when the quota q is different from the simple
majority case, q=0.5, where there is a supermajority decision rule.
(4) The Power of a Member to Prevent Action measures the ability of member i to p event a
decision being taken, denoted PPAi. It is defined as the proportion of wi ning divisions that are
swings for i:
PPAi = hi / w i=1,2,..,n.
(5) The Power of a Member to Initiate Actionis complementary to this, measuring member i’s
power to get its proposals accepted, denoted PIAi. It is formally defined as the number of swings
for i as a proportion of the total number of divisions that do not produce a decision without the
support of i.
PIA i = hi / ( 2n - w) i=1,2,..,n.
Both (4) and (5) can be regarded as rescalings of the Banzhaf or Penrose index. They are both
identical to the P nrose index when q=0.5, since then there is no difference between the power to
prevent action and the power to initiate action. However there is a difference where there is a
11
supermajority decision rule, and they are useful in enabling the analysis to focus on these two
different aspects of members’ voting power. The distinction is especially useful in the
discussions surrounding the EU Council of Ministers where the choice of quota has been
motivated to a considerable extent by considerations of individual members’ and groups of
members’ ability to block decisions.
The relationships among the indices are brought out by noting that we can write the P nrose
measure as:
          pi  = hi/ 2n-1 = 2(hi / w).(w/2
n) =  2PPAi.PTA,
and, pi  = hi/ 2n-1 = 2[hi / ( 2
n - w)]. [( 2n - w). /2n] =  2PIAi.[1 - PTA]
Therefore the P nrose measure combines the individual member's power either to prevent action
or to initiate action with the power of the body to act.10. These measures are used to compare the
properties of different quotas.
5. FAIR WEIGHTING AND REWEIGHTING
The first main question to be addressed using the measures of voting power defined in the last
section is whether the weights agreed in the Nice Treaty are appropriate. I address this question
using two different approaches. First I calculate the power indices and compare them in terms of
a criterion of fairness, and second I use an iterative algorithm to determine what ideally they
should be in order to be fair in this sense. I propose that the votes can be r weighed routinely in
this way whenever new members are admitted.
Felsenthal and Machover (2000) propose basing the allocation of voting weight on the principle
of equitability whereby citizens of all member countries should have equal voting power.
Decision making is modelled as a two-stage voting system in which the first stage is the ordinary
political process in each member country and the second stage is weighted voting in the Council.
                                         
10 It is also of interest to note that the Penrose index pi is the harmonic mean of PIAi and PPAi:  1/pi = (1/PPAi +
1/PIAi)/2 (Dubey and Shapley (1979)).
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Formally fair weights are defined by the following two stages of voting:
Stage 1. Citizen Voting in Member States. Each member country holds an election or plebiscite
on the basis of One Person One Vote and a simple majority decision rule. Each citizen has the
same voting power as any other within the same country but this, as measured by their Pen ose
index, is different in each country. Electors in a small country have a much greater chance of a
swing than those in a large country; this was formally analysed by Penrose (1946) who showed
the probability to be inversely proportional to the square root of the number of electors. I use
population as a proxy for the number of electors.
Stage 2. Weighted Voting in the Council of Ministers. Each member state casts all its weighted
votes according to the result of Stage 1. Its Penrose index is the probability of a swing within this
weighted voting body.
The product of these two probabilities, at Stage 1 and Stage 2, for any member country,
measures the power of one of its citizens, as the probability of his or her theoretically being able
to determine the overall outcome. The principle of fairness suggests that this measure should be
equal in all member countries and therefore voting weights should be allocated such that the
power indices of each member are proportional to the square roots of populations.
Let the population of member state i be denoted by pi. Then the fair weights w1*, 2*,   wn*, are
determined by the property that the resulting Penrose indices satisfy
pi =  k pi0.5  ,   for some k>0,      i=1,2,…,n.
Let the share of member i in the sum of the square roots of populations be ti. That is, let ti = pi0.5/
Spj0.5,  i =1,2,…, n. Then the ti are the target values for the Banzhaf indices which will be used
to determine our choice of weights. This must be done by an iterative procedure, successively
computing the power indices and reweighting to bring them closer to the target values; iterations
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continue until convergence has occurred according to some appropriate stopping rule.11 The
algorithm can be thought of as the determination of a fixed point of a mapping from the unit
simplex to itself.
Let it be required that member i should possess a voting power of ti, where S ti =1. The problem
is to find weights wi*, w2*, . .., wn*    that have associated power indices, bi , such that bi = ti, for
all i. For notational simplicity I denote the target, the weights and corresponding power indices,
as functions of the weights, by the n-vectors t, w and b(w).
Let the weights after d iterations be denoted by the vector w(d), and c rresponding power indices
by the vector of functions b(w(d)). The iterative procedure consists of an intial guess w(0) and an
updating rule:
w(d+1) = w(d) + l(t - b(w(d))) (1)
for some appropriate scalar l>0.
If power indices are continuous functions of the weights, (1) is a continuous point-to-point
mapping of a compact convex set into itself, therefore satisfies the conditions of the Brouwer
fixed point theorem and has a unique fixed point.12 If the procedure converges to a vector, w*,
then that will be the desired weight vector, since then:
w*=w* + l(t - b(w*)) and so t = b(w*).
                                         
11 A similar approach has been proposed by Laruelle and Widgren (1998) and used by Sutter (2000). It has also been
used in Leech (2000b). The question was discussed by Nurmi (1981).
12 The continuity property does not strictly hold for small voting bodies. The Penros  index is not continuous since it
is a rational number and therefore the Banzhaf index is also a rational number. However for large n it seems
reasonable to assume that the conditions hold approximately, and that the approximation improves as n increases.
It does not follow from this that a member’s Banzhaf index necessarily increases when it is allocated more weight;
in fact the opposite can occur. Felsenthal and Machover (1998, p 253) call this the “fattening paradox”. It is a
property of the normalised power index only and is not shared by the P nrose measure. How serious this is for the
algorithm employed in this paper is unclear since all that is needed for the fixed-point theorem on which it is based
is that the mapping be continuous, not monotonic. Then, convergence guarantees finding a fixed point.
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Convergence can be defined in terms of a measure of the distance between b(w(p)) and t a d
some stopping criterion. The simple sum of squares (b i
(d)å - t i )2  with a suitable stopping
criterion has been found to work well in practice.13 The algorithm is set out graphically in Figure
1.
6. VOTING POWER UNDER THE NICE TREATY
Tables 4 and 5 present the results of applying this approach to the Nice Treaty.14 Table 4 shows
the analysis for N15; the same information is displayed graphically in Figure 2. In the first
column after the names of the countries are the weights expressed as percentages of the total,
then the Banzhaf power indices (columns (3) and (4)). The effect of the 62% population
condition is evident from the greater power of Germany than the other three of the big four
despite its having the same weight. It appears from comparing these two columns that the
allocation of weights is very close to  being proportional: that is, that weight shares and power
indices are almost the same. This can be seen from Figure 2(a), which shows these numbers for
each country against a population scale, and Figure 2(b), which shows them for each country
separately: the graphs for weight and power almost coincide for every member country.
That a member’s power index is approximately proportional to its share of the weight does not
mean that the weights are fair. Comparing the power indices with their target values (column (5))
shows that there are some discrepancies from fair weights, in particular Germans are
underrepresented and Spaniards overrepresented: Germany’s power index is 12.11% compared
with a target of 13.97%, Spain’s power index is 11.11% compared with its target of 9.68%. For
all other countries the discrepancy is less than one percentage point.
                                         
13 For N15 the algorithm was found to converge to an accuracy in terms of this criterion of the order of 10-8, but it
was not possible to get convergence with a smaller value. For N27 it easily converged to with respect to a stopping
rule of the order of10-10. The power indices were computed exactly using the program ipnice (Leech (2001b)). In
Leech (2000b) the algorithm was used to compute fair weights for the International Monetary Fund Board of
Governors with n=178. In this case the power indices were calculated using a different program suitable for large n;
the accuracy achieved in terms of the sum of squares stopping rule was of the order of 10-17.
14 The computer program used was Leech (2001b).
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Table 4: Voting Power in N15
N15 Q1=169 Q2=62%     
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Weight Country Weight% Bz Index % Pop% Fair Weight %Pop%
29Germany 12.24 12.11 13.97 15.12 21.858
29UK 12.24 11.99 11.87 12.06 15.786
29France 12.24 11.99 11.84 12.05 15.711
29Italy 12.24 11.99 11.70 11.99 15.350
27Spain 11.39 11.11 9.68 9.34 10.496
13Netherlands 5.49 5.50 6.12 5.98 4.199
12Greece 5.06 5.16 5.00 4.64 2.806
12Belgium 5.06 5.16 4.93 4.61 2.721
12Portugal 5.06 5.16 4.87 4.58 2.659
10Sweden 4.22 4.30 4.59 4.47 2.359
10Austria 4.22 4.30 4.38 4.41 2.153
7Denmark 2.95 3.09 3.55 3.22 1.416
7Finland 2.95 3.09 3.50 3.20 1.375
7Ireland 2.95 3.09 2.98 3.03 0.998
4Luxembourg 1.69 1.96 1.01 1.29 0.114
237 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Applying the iterative algorithm gives the fair weights, listed in column (6). The only member
countries whose weights change substantially are Germany and Spain: Germany’s weight has
now increased to 15.12 and Spain’s reduced to 9.34 percent of the votes. These results are shown
in Figure 2(a) and 2(b) also.
The equivalent analysis for N27 is presented in Table 5 and Figure 3. A broadly similar story
emerges with power and weight being roughly proportional, although the discrepancy for the big
four countries is now larger, more than half a percentage point. The population condition no
longer favours Germany, its power index being the same as that of the UK, France and Italy.
However these are not fair weights in that Germany is under represented and both Spain and
Poland are over represented: Germany has a power index of 7.78% compared with a target of
9.54%, Spain and Poland have a power index of 7.42% compared with targets of 6.61% and
6.55%; also Romania is underrepresented. Applying the algorithm to compute the fair weights
adjusts these discrepancies (column (6)). The most substantial changes are that Germany should
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have 12.21 (instead of 8.41) percent of the weight, Spain’s and Poland’s weights should be
reduced to 6.53 and 6.45 (instead of 7.83) percent and Romania’s increased to 4.74 (instead of
4.06) percent. Some of the changes for other countries are large in relative terms, compared with
their absolute weight, but they make little difference in absolute terms.
Table 5: Voting Power in N27
N27 Q1=255 Q2=62%    
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Weight Country Weight %Bz Index % Pop.% Fair Weight%Pop.%
29Germany 8.41 7.78 9.54 12.21 17.049
29UK 8.41 7.78 8.10 8.54 12.313
29France 8.41 7.78 8.09 8.53 12.254
29Italy 8.41 7.78 7.99 8.36 11.973
27Spain 7.83 7.42 6.61 6.53 8.187
27Poland 7.83 7.42 6.55 6.45 8.036
14Romania 4.06 4.26 4.99 4.74 4.674
13Netherlands 3.77 3.97 4.18 3.92 3.275
12Greece 3.48 3.68 3.42 3.18 2.189
12Czech Rep 3.48 3.68 3.38 3.14 2.138
12Belgium 3.48 3.68 3.37 3.14 2.122
12Hungary 3.48 3.68 3.35 3.12 2.097
12Portugal 3.48 3.68 3.33 3.10 2.074
10Sweden 2.90 3.09 3.13 2.91 1.840
10Bulgaria 2.90 3.09 3.02 2.80 1.710
10Austria 2.90 3.09 2.99 2.77 1.680
7Slovakia 2.03 2.18 2.45 2.26 1.121
7Denmark 2.03 2.18 2.43 2.24 1.104
7Finland 2.03 2.18 2.39 2.21 1.072
7Ireland 2.03 2.18 2.04 1.88 0.778
7Lithuania 2.03 2.18 2.03 1.87 0.769
4Latvia 1.16 1.25 1.64 1.51 0.507
4Slovenia 1.16 1.25 1.48 1.36 0.411
4Estonia 1.16 1.25 1.27 1.17 0.301
4Cyprus 1.16 1.25 0.91 0.83 0.156
4Luxembourg 1.16 1.25 0.69 0.63 0.089
3Malta 0.87 0.94 0.65 0.60 0.079
345 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.000
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7. THE EFFECT OF THE CHOICE OF QUOTA FOR WEIGHTED MAJORITY VOTING
The analysis so far has been in terms of the relative voting power of each member country within
a given decision-making system, defined by a particular quota, and no consideration has been
given to what that ought to be. For N15 q was equal to 71.3%, and for N27, 73.9%. Now in this
section the decision rule becomes the main focus of the analysis and the methodology used to
study it is to compute the absolute power measures of Coleman as well as the Penrose measure
of voting power. I allow the decision rule as determined by the value of q to vary over its entire
feasible range from a simple majority, q=50 %, to unanimity, q=100%. In order to define the
problem to be analysed clearly, I assume there to be a single decision rule based on weighted
majority voting only, previously identified as W15 and W27, the weights having been fixed in
the Nice Treaty; the other two conditions in N15 and N27 (the majority of countries and 62% of
the population) are ignored.15 The analysis of this section illuminates member countries’ powers
to prevent action and to initiate action as separate properties of the voting system, affecting
countries’ sovereignty and shows how these depend on q. It also shows how the power to act of
the Council itself is affected. An important aspect is that it allows us to study the tradeoff
between members’ powers to prevent action and the power of the Council of Ministers to act,
which is at the heart of the political development of the European Union.
The results for W15 are presented first, in Figure 4.16 Figure 4(a) shows the effect of the quota on
the power of the Council to act. Its maximum value is 0.5 when q=50% and its minimum value
2-15 = 3.05E-5 when q=100%. It is clear that the value of q set by the Nice Treaty makes it very
difficult to make a decision in the Council, its power to act when q=71.3% being only 0.0826.
This means that only 8.26% of divisions, a priori, would result in a decision. Therefore there is a
very strong conservative bias.
Figure 4(b) shows how the quota affects the powers of members to prevent action, their
capacities to block initiatives they do not like. Not surprisingly it increases monotonically for all
                                         
15 The reason for doing this is that, if the quota for weighted voting is varied, there seems no particular reason not to
vary the population quota also; there is nothing absolute about 62%. The analysis could just as easily be done for
N15 and N27. In any case the power indices for W15 and W27 are almost identical to those for N15 and N27.
16 Using the computer program Leech (2001a).
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countries as q increases until it reaches a maximum of 1 when q=100 and all members have a
veto. For q=71.3% all members have a substantial power to prevent action: for each of Germany,
the UK, France and Italy it is 0.735 (one of the big four countries can block 73.5% of divisions),
for Netherlands 0.342, and even for the smallest member Luxembourg it is 0.125. Figure 4(c)
shows the equivalent diagram for the power to initiate action. This measure of power falls very
rapidly indeed for every member as q increases, showing that blocking power is bought at a high
price in terms of loss of influence. Figure 4(d) shows the Penrose power measure against q. It
confirms that all members, most significantly the largest countries, suffer a loss of influence, in
choosing too high a quota.
Figure 5 shows the equivalent analysis for W27. The findings are substantially the same: Figure
5(a) shows the power to act falls very rapidly as q increases, reaching 10% when q=65%. The
effect of the Nice Treaty, which set q=73.9%,  is even worse for this case, with the power to act
falling to  as low as 0.02: only 2% of divisions a pri ri lead to a decision. The diagrams showing
the powers of member countries to prevent action, Figure 5(b), to initiate action, Figure 5(c), and
Penrose voting power, Figure 5(d), give similar results to N15. Thus, again the conclusion is that
choosing too high a value of q is counterproductive to a member country’s own sovereignty
within the EU.
Figures 6 and 7 show the same information for W15 and W27 as relationships between member
countries’ own absolute power measures and the power of the Council to act as q varies. These
diagrams make explicit the tradeoffs involved in qualified majority voting. Figure 6 (a) plots the
power to prevent action for each member against the power of the Council to act. There would
seem to be a fairly strong tradeoff for the largest five countries showing how much blocking
power they must give up in order to create an effective Council. Figure 6(b) shows a very direct
relationship between the power to initiate action of each member and the power to act, perhaps
not surprisingly. Figure 6(c) shows the relationships between powers of members and the power
to act of the Council. Again there is a direct relationship in every case suggesting that member
countries have greater influence through higher power of the council to act. Figure 7 shows the
same analyses for W27, leading to the same conclusion.
19
8. CONCLUSIONS
This paper has reported on a study of the system of Qualified Majority Voting in the European
Union Council of Ministers using the methods of a priori voting power analysis. The perspective
of the study has been that of an enlarging union to which new members join from time to time, as
envisaged in the Treaty of Nice to apply from 2005.
Two investigations have been carried out. First, a study of weighted voting using the Banzhaf
power index aimed at discovering if the allocation of weights between member countries is fair
in a relative sense. Fair weights are defined to be such as to equalise voting power of citizens in
all member countries. Second, a study of the effects of the majority quota both on the measures
of absolute power of each member country and the power to act of the Council itself. For each
investigation two extreme scenarios have been considered as envisaged by the Treaty: the union
of 15, no new members having acceded, and the maxiumum expansion, with 12 candidates
having joined.
From the perspective of enlargement considered in general terms, it is proposed that fair weights
could be determined as a routine or simply technical matter, by means of an algorithm, for any
changes to the membership that may occur. This is applied to the two extreme scenarios
considered.
The findings of the analysis of fair weights are: first, that the weights laid down by the Nice
Treaty are approximately proportional to the voting power they represent; second, that they are
close to being fair for most members; third, that German and Romanian citizens will be under
represented, Spanish and Polish citizens over represented.
The results of the analysis of the majority quota are: first, that the effectiveness of the Council as
measured by its power to act will be very small because of the high level at which the quota has
always been set (about 71%) and will continue to be set; second, the Treaty’s provision to raise it
to almost 74% when many new members join makes this feature considerably worse; third, there
is a trade-off between individual member countries’ blocking powers and the power to act, but a
direct relation between a country’s overall measure of power and the power of the Council to act.
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The main conclusion of this analysis is that decision making within the Council of Ministers is
likely to be rigid because of members’ being overly concerned with their own blocking powers.
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Update Weights:
 wi = wi + l(ti - bi), i=1,n
Test Convergence:
Is |bi - ti|<e " i?
Stop
Calculate Power Indices:
b   = b  (w1, w2, ... , wn)
Input Data:
Targets ti
Initial Weights wi  i=1,n
Yes
No
Figure 1:Flowchart of an Iterative Algorithm to Determine Weights
for Given Target Powers
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Figure 2(a): N15 Weight, Power and Fair Weight by Population   
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Figure 2(b): N15 Weight, Power and Fair Weight by Country   
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Figure 3(a): N27 Weight, Power and Fair Weight by Population   
0.00
2.00
4.00
6.00
8.00
10.00
12.00
14.00
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18
Population %
Weight %
Bz Index %
 ¦Pop.%
Fair Weight%
Figure 3(b): N27 Weight, Power and Fair Weight by Country     
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Figure 4(a): W15 Effect of the Quota on the Power of the Council to Act       
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Figure 4(b): W15 Effect of Q on Power to Prevent Action    
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Figure 4(c): W15 Effect of Q on Power to Initiate Action   
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Figure 4(d): W15 Effect of Q on the Penrose Power Measure,pi         
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Figure 5(a): W27 Effect of Q on Power of the Council to Act    
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Figure 5(b): W27 Effect of Q on Power to Prevent Action
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Figure 5(c): W27  Effect of Q on Power to Initiate Action   
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Figure 5(d): W27: Penrose Power Measure pi     
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Figure 6(a): W15 Power to Prevent Action v PTA                  
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Figure 6(b): W15 Power to Initiate Action v PTA     
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Figure 6(c): W15 Penrose Power Measure, pi v PTA      
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Figure 7(a): W27 Countries' Power to Prevent Action v PTA        
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Figure 7(b): W27 Countries' Powers to Initiate Action v PTA     
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Figure 7(c): W27 Penrose Power Measure pi v PTA
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